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Abstract
To manage operational risk banks increasingly use data coming from
data consortia formed by peer institutions. Although existing data consor-
tia seem to work appropriately, it is worth examining why banks report
properly (that is, thoroughly and truthfully), since in several countries
where new data consortia are planned to be set up, there are fears that
banks may choose to report untruthfully or hide information (what we
call misreporting). We show that if misreporting cannot be detected,
then even in an innitely repeated setup the game has multiple equilibria,
so proper reporting is not the unique outcome. Then we analyze two types
of sanctions. When the punishment is non-monetary (e.g. exclusion from
the consortium for a given number of periods), then for some parameter
values even the harshest punishment cannot bring about proper reporting
as the unique outcome. Nonetheless, a numerical example suggests that
by designing adequately the data consortium, proper reporting can be ad-
vanced, without overly compromising anonymity. When a monetary ne
is imposed on misreporting banks, then a su¢ ciently sever punishment
results in proper reporting, even if anonymity is maintained in the limit.
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1 Introduction
Although operational risk has a¤ected nancial institutions throughout their
history, the last two decades saw a dramatic increase in the attention devoted
to it. A number of highly publicized and costly fraudulent events related to
operational risk (e.g. rogue trading at Barings and at Daiwa Bank in 1995
and at Société Générale in 2008) led to the recognition of operational risk as
a major standalone risk. As a consequence, the Basel Capital Accord (the so-
called Basel II framework) separated it explicitly from credit and market risks
and set specic regulatory standards to manage it. The Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision dened operational risk as "the risk of loss resulting from
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external
events". The importance of operational risk management is also highlighted by
the fact that banks allocate a considerable part of their capital to it.1
If a risk event has not materialized at the individiual institutional level, it
does not mean that there is no risk exposure. To overcome this problem, banks
have come to rely increasingly on external data and they are using operational
loss experience from peer institutions to improve their risk management - as
an input to both statistical-econometric models and to qualitative techniques
such as benchmarking or risk assessment. External data come from public and
consortium-type databases. In the latter case, nancial institutions report, pool
and share data on operational risk events with each other on a voluntary basis
(see, for instance, Voit (2007) or Wood (2007)). Examples include ABA (US),
DAKOR (Germany), DIPO (Italy), DSGV Datapool (Germany), GOLD (UK),
HunOR (Hungary) and ORX (international). European operational risk data
consortia have regular meetings in order to share experiences.2
Reporting standards vary across data consortia, but the following informa-
tion is generally required: classication data about the origination of the event
(e.g. business line, event category, country, etc.), reference dates (date of oc-
curence, discovery and recognition) and the amount of loss. Generally, consortia
also require a description of the case. The more detailed the information about
an operational risk event, the more helpful it is for other banks to learn from it.
However, secrecy is an integral part of bank management, as banks do not like
to disclose internal information. This is especially true for data on failures. For
this reason anonymity is of utmost importance in any data consortium. With-
out a high level of anonymity banks would be reluctant to participate. That is
why, along with the data already mentioned, banks are required to also send
scaling factors and indicators for anonymization purposes. Using these factors
the consortium might transform the data so that the source bank cannot be
identied.
1According to a survey (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009)), 7.5 % of the
consolidated Tier 1 capital of the surveyed banks is allocated to operational risk. Publicly
available information indicates that this share is even higher for large international banks.
According to their 2012 Annual Reports, J.P. Morgan Chase and Deutsche Bank allocated
USD 15.9 billion and EUR 5 billion to operational risk, corresponding to 18 and 17 % of their
total economic capital, respectively.
2See, for insatnce, DIPO events at: http://www.dipo-operationalrisk.it/EN.
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There is a natural tension between the desire to have detailed reports about
other banksoperational events and low willingness to share information about
own experiences. In the presence of a high level of anonymity (i.e. anonymity
not only in a bank-to-bank relationship, but also in the case of bank-to-data
manager relationship), banks may not do their best when reporting, for example
not reporting truthfully or hiding operational risk events. Yet, if careless and
unreliable reporting (henceforth, misreporting) becomes generalized, then the
information obtained from the consortium loses its value and the consortium
may break down. These considerations should be taken into account setting
up such a data-sharing arrangement. John Rumsey (2011) reports di¢ culties
about setting up operational risk loss databases in Latin America because banks
fear the loss of condentiality.3 He also notes that even if a database is set
up (e.g. in Argentina participation in a database is mandatory), banks may
react to such fears by concealing information and not reporting thoroughly and
carefully. Hence, it seems important to understand why a bank would choose to
report untruthfully. In this paper, we examine the incentives to start reporting
untruthfully in a data consortium.
First, we study the consequences of having a very high level of anonymity
that does not allow the detection of misreporting. Ex ante identical banks
are hit by an operational shock in each period. The operational shock is bi-
nary, with the large shock representing the low frequency - high severity events.
Small shocks exemplify the high frequency - low severity events. They form a
data consortium to improve their risk management. Banks may report truth-
fully their operational risk event or choose to misreport to the consortium that
computes a set of information based on the reports. This set of information
is used to manage their operational risk. The benets of being a member of
the data consortium come through enhanced operational risk management only
if the external data are of good quality. If a set of information provided by
the data manager is believed to be based on poor data, then banks prefer to
disregard it. More precisely, a set of information is assumed to be useful only
if all the other banks have reported truthfully. Furthermore, it is assumed that
in the latter case the set of information is valuable for an individual bank even
though that bank misreports. This assumption captures the idea that an indi-
vidual bank would prefer above all to have the truthful data of all other banks
without having to reveal its own operational losses. The cost of participating
in a consortium is related to the additional e¤orts implied by reporting and the
potential negative e¤ects if information about the loss becomes public due to
leakage. Banks do not monitor the actions of other banks, a feature that exac-
erbates cooperation. In fact, in the one-shot simultaneous game misreporting
is the dominant strategy if misreporting cannot be detected. If banks gener-
ally misreport, then the data consortium is dysfunctional and loses its raison
dêtre. However, data consortia are established over an indenite horizon, so it
is natural to think about banks participating in a repeated game. Even if misre-
3 In personal communication, Gergely Szabolcs told us about the same kind of fears re-
ported by Russian bank o¢ cers at a conference that dealt with the possibilities of establishing
operational risk loss databases in Russia.
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porting is unobservable, with innitely repeated interactions truthful reporting
in each period becomes a possible outcome, but not the unique one. We ar-
gue that in countries where data consortia work appropriately, prevailing norms
and cultural factors (the study of which is beyond the scope of this paper) may
enforce the e¢ cient equilibrium. However, it is not guaranteed that in other
countries similar forces select the same equilibrium. Potentially, in the absence
of any central authority data consortia may not work adequately. Therefore, we
introduce the possibility that a supervisor detects misreporting with some prob-
ability. This violates anonymity, but it helps to implement truthful reporting
as a unique outcome by using punishment. Two possible forms of punishment
are examined. In the case of non-monetary punishment, detected misreporting
implies exclusion from the data consortium for a nite time horizon. Thus, the
probability of examination and the length of exclusion determines the expected
punishment. We derive a condition depending on these punishment parameters,
which ensures that each bank reports truthfully in each period. Unfortunately,
this condition cannot be satised for some range of the parameter values, in-
dicating that non-monetary punishment may prove insu¢ cient to deter banks
from misreporting. However, a numerical example suggests that by appropriate
choice of the probability of examination and the length of exclusion, the data
consortium can achieve truthful reporting, without compromising anonymity
unreasonably. If a monetary punishment is in place, then even if the proba-
bility of examination goes to zero (or, equivalently, anonymity is maintained)
su¢ ciently severe monetary punishment induces the banks to report truthfully.
Hence, a properly set monetary ne may ensure truthful reporting without vi-
olating anonymity. Moreover, the ne is never imposed, because the threat of
having to pay it deters banks from misreporting.
Since anonimity is a key issue in this paper, some remarks are in order.
Financial supervisory bodies (like the FSA in the UK or Ban in Germany,
etc.) have the information and competence to check the internal processes of
banks related to operational risk, but data consortia are not subject to nan-
cial supervision de jure. However de facto, latent supervisory control already
takes place in some cases. For example, at DIPO (the database of the Italian
Banking Association), the custodian knows which member has sent an event,
so the custodian knows which bank su¤ered that loss. As is apparent from the
functioning of DIPO, they do whatever they can in terms of devices and internal
procedure to guarantee anonimity in the bank-to-bank and custodian-to-third
parties relationships, but in the bank-to-custodian relationship anonymity is not
a rst-order issue. This is the consequence of mutual trust between the banks
and the custodian. This trust also enables DIPO to exert some pressure on the
banks to report properly, for instance by cross-checking reports with other data-
bases. Thus, the loss of anonymity is used to enhance the performance of the
database. Another form of control in the case of DIPO is that sometimes Banca
dItalia requests data from them and member banks know it. The fact that
Banca dItalia has potential access to the data reported to the consortium rep-
resents a strong moral suasion against misreporting Hence, the custodian may
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have some control and power to incentivize member banks to report properly.4
To our best knowledge, our paper is the rst to study the conditions and
incentives that ensure that banks report truthfully to an operational risk data
consortium from a game-theoretical point of view. We hope that our results will
help to set appropriate rules for new data consortia that are expected to come
into being. For instance, the Russia Banking Advisory Project of the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation recommends the establishment of a data consortium
in Russia (Burucs (2009)).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briey review the
literature. In section 3, we present the model with the one-shot game, while in
section 4 we proceed to the analysis of the repeated game. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
Operational risk is generally characterized as "substantially unhedgeable and
possibly large enough to threaten the existence of a¤ected institutions" (Cum-
mins and Embrechts (2006)) as evidenced by losses that in some cases amounted
to billions of dollars. Chernobai et al. (2009) nd that there is a strong link
between individual operational events and rm-specic covariates, whereas the
macroeconomic environment has less e¤ect. Although this nding suggests that
operational risk is idiosyncratic, de Fontnouvelle et al. (2006) fail to reject the
hypothesis that the loss severity distribution across similar institutions is the
same; a reason which underpins the usefulness of external data. The main bene-
t of participating in a data consortium comes from the fact that it contributes
to a better operational risk management, helping to avoid the massive value
destruction that operational shocks may cause.
Generally, if negative information about the bank becomes publicly known,
the value of the bank reacts adversely to such an event. This explains banks
reluctance to disclose unfavorable information. Even if a high level of anonymity
is guaranteed, once the information leaves the bank, the bank cannot control
it completely. In the case of operational risk data consortia, the reports are
rst handled by a data manager (or custodian) who represents the consortium.
The data manager checks the quality of the data and carries out anonymiza-
tion. In some cases, the data manager knows where the data come from (for
example, DIPO), while in others it is not the case (e.g. ABA). Furthermore,
the descriptions of the operational risk events may give hints about the identity
of the reporting bank.5 The data collection process and these descriptions are
channels that potentially may lead to a leakage of information. Cummins et al.
(2006) show a strong, statistically signicant negative stock price reaction when
operational losses become publicly known. Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005)
4We are tremendously grateful to Claudia Pasquini from DIPO to share with us these
details.
5Obviously, banks may be very careful about such descriptions and do not reveal any
information about themselves, but in this case the informativeness and consequently the use-
fulness of the report may be reduced. The trade-o¤ between usefulness and anonymity seems
unavoidable.
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nd that market value declines one-for-one with operational losses caused by
external events, and the fall is even greater in cases involving internal fraud.
These ndings have been conrmed by Gillet et al. (2010). Generally, sooner or
later big operational losses make it to the press, so in principle there is no reason
to misreport them. However, it may be an important decision when to reveal
them and how to sweeten them. These considerations may lead to delayed and
distorted reports. Note that both strategic and psychological forces may cause
misreporting.
As regards economic theory, our study is related to the literature on repeated
games (see, for instance, Mailath-Samuelson (2006)). Banks play an n-player
prisoners dilemma, since given truthful reporting of the other banks misreport-
ing is always better than being truthful for a single iteration. Although banks
cannot directly observe other banksactions, through the payo¤s they notice
if there was misreporting, as it will become clear later from the details of the
model. Without the possibility of identifying the misreporting bank, punish-
ment imposed by individual banks is ine¢ cient because it cannot be directed
with certainty towards the untruthful bank, so it reduces social welfare. In these
games of imperfect monitoring, intertemporal incentives are used to induce co-
operation.6
To keep the analysis tractable, we maintain the possibility of punishment
and suppose that there is a supervisor who has the right to examine the validity
of reported data and to impose a punishment in an e¢ cient way. We do not
model the emergence of the supervisor who can be seen as an agent to whom
members of the data consortium delegate monitoring, following the idea of Di-
amond (1984). Thus, the idea of supervisor, embodies the possibility to detect
misreporting.
3 Model
There is a set of banks N = f1; 2; :::; ng that establish a data consortium to
improve their operational risk management. Suppose that n > 2 and that
banks are ex ante identical.7
Assume that bank i is hit in period t by a shock that follows a Bernoulli
distribution with unknown parameter pi;t. The resulting loss is represented by
xi;t 2 f0; 1g :8 For simplicity, we assume that neither pi;t; nor xi;t change over
time, so we drop the time subscript. Suppose that pi is drawn from some ran-
dom distribution. Thus, in any period bank i su¤ers a shock of magnitude 1
6See chapter 12 in Mailath-Samuelson (2006) for games with imperfect monitoring.
7The least number of banks forming a data consortium that we know of is eleven (case of
DAKOR, Germany). There is no required minimum number of institutions to form a data
consortium; however, the representativeness with respect to operation does matter for banks
and coverage in terms of market share is important as well. Small banks with less data may be
keen to participate in data consortia, while bigger banks with large internal databases could
be reluctant to do so.
8Assuming continuous shocks would make the analysis more cumbersome, without yielding
new insights.
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with probability pi, and with complementary probability it su¤ers a shock of
magnitude 0. Magnitude-1 losses can be thought of as the low frequency-high
severity events, whereas magnitude-0 losses represent the high frequency-low
severity events. Without any data-sharing arrangement, bank i expects a large
shock with probability pi and prepares optimally for operational risk manage-
ment using this information. Note that if the distribution of pi was degenerate,
then data consortia would be redundant, because setting aside su¢ cient capital
(determined by pi) is the best a bank could do and additional information from
other banks would be inneccesary. That is why we add uncertainty and assume
that pi is drawn from a random distribution. Useful data from the data consor-
tium reduces uncertainty and allows to form more accurate expectations about
pi, that is the probability of the occurrence of a large shock in the next period.9
As a member of a data consortium, a bank reports the shock that realized in
period t 1 to the consortium. We denote the vector of the true shocks at period
t   1 by xt 1 = (x1;t 1; ::; xn;t 1). Let x^i;t 1 denote the report made by bank
i, while the vector of all reports is represented by x^t 1 = (x^1;t 1; ::; x^n;t 1).
Let x^ i;t 1 represent the vector of reports of all the banks except for bank i.
Based on the vector of reports, the data manager calculates the set of values
(f(x^t 1)) that banks use to improve operational risk management in period t.
We do not model explicitly optimal operational risk management; rather, we
simply suppose that using the true set of values (that is, f(xt 1)) banks are
able to improve risk management, compared to the case without a data consor-
tium. However, banks nd the set of values given by the data manager to be
useful only if the reports are of su¢ ciently good quality. Banks cannot verify
the validity of reports when they receive f(x^t 1). Nor can they see what the
other banks report, hence they play a simultaneous-move game. Therefore, from
a banks perspective the main question is whether the other banks will report
truthfully or not; and in the face of this belief it should decide how to report.10
3.1 Costs
To have access to the set of information computed by the data manager, a bank
has to provide information about its own operational risk events. Providing
reliable information complying with the high reporting standards required by
the consortia is costly. The cost does not come from collecting the operational
loss events, but from the tension that while each bank values true external
data, no bank likes to give away information about losses. For instance, the
unreasonable fear to share data on operational risk events reported by Rumsey
(2011) may cause banks to perceive it costly to provide the required information.
Thus, the cost may appear as psychological strain and mistrust. Compared to
9These assumptions do not attempt to capture reality literally, neither are they crucial
for the main message of the paper. We use them only to complete our model and motivate
theoretically why data consortia are important.
10We do not model entry into and exit from the consortium explicitly. Banks are assumed
to be members of the consortium (automatic entry), and if a bank believes the data coming
from the consortium to be unreliable, then it can choose to misreport as well (implicit exit).
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the case when a bank receives the external data and does not have to give
anything in exchange, having to report losses yields less utility.
We suppose that the cost of reporting magnitude-0 events is zero, whereas
that of reporting magnitude-1 shocks is positive. Since banks are ex ante iden-
tical, the cost of reporting is uniform across them. Formally,
c(xi;t) =

0 if xi;t = 0
tcc if xi;t = 1
; (1)
where c > 0 and c 2 [0; 1] : The binary nature of cost reects the dual
characteristic of operational loss events. High frequency-low impact events are
accepted as normal consequences of banksdaily operation. Moreover, reporting
these events does not entail much e¤ort. However, if they become public, low
frequency-high severity events impair market value seriously, as they signal a
weak internal control environment (see Chernobai et al. (2009)), and banks may
be more reluctant to report them, supposing higher (potentially psychological)
cost of these events. The tc term captures the e¤ect that as time passes the
cost may diminish when c < 1 c = 1 represents time-invariant costs.
3.2 Payo¤s
Assume that the payo¤ of participating in a data consortium relates in an ad-
ditive manner to the total payo¤ of the bank. As a consequence, banks report
truthfully if the benets outweigh the costs.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the benets of knowing the true
external data and managing properly next periods operational risks to 1 at
t = 0, when the consortium is set up: If the external data is of low quality due
to misreporting, then the benet is k < 1: Similarly to the costs, we allow that
benets vary with time, but still assume that the benets are uniform across
banks. Formally,
bi;t =

tb if x^ i;t = x i;t
ktb otherwise
: (2)
We suppose that b 2 [0; 1], reecting that as time goes by, having more
reliable data from the consortium is possibly of less additional value than at the
beginning. We allow for the case that c 6= b; so the change in the costs and
benets may be di¤erent.11 We assume that c < 1, so that at the beginning
benets outweigh costs and participation in a well-functioning consortium is
useful.
As a consequence, a bank hit by a small shock reports truthfully and derives
utility tb from the information received if the other banks have reported truth-
fully. When hit by a large shock, upon truthful reporting bank is payo¤ has
the following form:
i;t(f(x^t); c j xi;t = 1; x^i;t = xi;t) =

tb   tcc if x^ i;t = x i;t
tbk   tcc otherwise.
: (3)
11We thank for an anonymous referee for suggesting time-varying costs and benets.
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Note that the operational shock does not appear explicitly in the payo¤s.
The payo¤ function takes into account if operational risk is properly managed
with the help of external data (benet of tb) or if it is not (benet of 
t
bk).
We assume that k < c, so a bank prefers staying out of the data consortium to
being a truthfully reporting member of a dysfunctional consortium.
A bank that misreports avoids the costs but enjoys the benets of the data
consortium only if the other banks report truthfully. Thus, the payo¤ is:
i;t(f(x^t); c j xi;t = 1; x^i;t 6= xi;t) =

tb if x^ i;t = x i;t
0 otherwise.
: (4)
If banks misreport generally, then they receive zero payo¤, which can be
seen as equivalent to the breakdown of the consortium.
Note that our payo¤s are simplied and focus on the current period. How-
ever, the most recent data in data consortia are often incomplete and unreliable,
and it takes some time until trustworthy and solid data emerge. Then period
in our model can be interpreted as the latest time interval for which good and
reliable data are available.
To x ideas, consider Table 1 where tr stands for truthful reporting and m
denotes misreporting. Suppose that the row player is bank i, while the column
player represents the rest of the banks. For the sake of simplicity, assume that
the rest of the banks use a coordination device, so they act in the same way
and b = c = 1. Therefore, the payo¤ of the column player is that of a
representative bank of the rest of banks.12
tr m
tr 1  c; 1  c k   c; 1
m 1, k   c 0,0
Table 1. Normal-form representation of the reporting game
First, we analyze the stage game, which is a simultaneous-move game. Banks
report their losses without knowing what the other banks report. Thus, banks
cannot condition their report on observable reports made by other banks. We
focus on pure strategy equilibria. The strategy of bank i in any period is to be
truthful (denoted as tr) or to misreport (denoted as m). Thus, si = ftr;mg for
i 2 N . Being truthful means that the report made by bank i (x^i) is equal to
the realization of the shock (x^i = xi). Misreporting implies the opposite.
The optimal action of any of those banks depends on what it believes about
the truthfulness of the other banks report. The payo¤ matrix is symmetric
for each bank, with the cost depending on the realized shock. Since k < c,
we have a prisoners dilemma with unique Nash equilibrium predicting that
both players will misreport. We consider symmetric equilibria, so given the
dominant strategy of banks hit by the large shock, in the unique outcome of
12Since our perspective is that of a bank and we want to understand when a bank may
decide to misreport, this simplication seems reasonable.
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the game all banks hit by magnitude-1 shock will misreport. Banks anticipating
this behavior will not nd the set of information provided by the consortium to
be useful, so they will not value being a member of it.13 Our rst result shows
that misreporting is predicted to be the observed behavior.
Proposition 1 In the one-shot game, misreporting is the dominant strategy.
Proof. As regards the truthfulness of the other banks, two cases matter: (1)
each of the other banks is believed to be truthful (x^ i;t = x i;t); (2) there is at
least one other bank that is not truthful (x^ i;t 6= x i;t). In the rst case, truthful
reporting yields 1  c, whereas misreporting results in a payo¤ of 1. Therefore,
misreporting is the best response. In the second case, if bank i misreports, then
its payo¤ will be 0, while truthful reporting will yield k   c < 0. Hence, again,
misreporting is the best response. As a consequence, independently of what
the other banks do, misreporting is the optimal action, so it is the dominant
strategy.
4 Repeated game
It is natural to consider data-sharing as an innitely repeated arrangement,
since it is not dened over a xed horizon. Suppose that banks use a common,
time-invariant discount factor,  2 (0; 1). The discount factor is an exogenous
characteristic of the banks and of the economic environment in general in which
they operate. Data consortia cannot a¤ect this variable. In a stable environ-
ment, banks plan over a long horizon and their discount factor is generally high.
Less stable environments with a high turnover of banks may imply a lower
discount factor.
The payo¤s are the same as in the stage game. If all banks report truthfully
in period t, then bank is payo¤ will be tb   tcc when hit by a large shock
(that happens with probability pi;t) and it will be 
t
b when su¤ering a shock of
magnitude 0. The expected discounted value of the payo¤s assuming that all
banks report truthfully in each period is given by:
13 If truthful reporting were not costly (c = 0), banks would have no incentive to misreport.
This is the case because even though all the other banks misreport, no cost is incurred by
reporting truthfully. This is the ideal case, when the data consortium works properly and
banks do not perceive reporting costly in any sense. Then fears of loss of condentiality will
not distort reporting and all member banks will enjoy the benets of the database.
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E(T ) = E(
1X
t=0
ti;t) =
1X
t=0
tE(i;t) =
=
1X
t=0
t

E(pi;t)(
t
b   tcc) + (1  E(pi;t))tb

= (5)
=
1X
t=0
ttb   E(pi;t)c
1X
t=0
ttc =
=
1
1  b
  pc
1  c
;
where E() is the expectation operator.
The main aim of our paper is to analyze the incentives to begin to report
untruthfully. We start assuming that the data consortium works appropriately
and all banks report truthfully. We compare the benets that a well-functioning
consortium yields to its members to the incentives to start misreporting, and de-
rive our results based on this kind of comparison. For a consortium with already
compromised data, the benets of being a member are lower, so members will
have less to lose if they misreport. Consequently, banks in such environments
may nd it advantageous to start misreporting earlier.
4.1 Decentralized case
First, we examine the decentralized case when there is no external supervisor,
so misreports cannot be detected. In this setup, actions are unobservable, but
banks are assumed to observe own stage payo¤s (i;t). Therefore, the bank is
able to notice perfectly through the own payo¤ if misreporting has occurred.
The idea behind this assumption is that banks are able to evaluate whether
participation in a data consortium is benecial or not.14 How can a bank notice
if other banks misreport? Suppose that several banks are a¤ected by the same
OR event (e.g. series of fraudulent bank card transactions) and these events
are publicly known. If in the data provided by the consortium the incidence
of these OR events is missing or is perceived to be underreported, then a bank
may have the impression that misreporting has happened. If a single bank can
be identied as misreporting, then that bank can be sanctioned without any
di¢ culty. In this section, we focus on the case where this identication is not
possible.
In real life it is more plausible to assume that misreportings are noticed with
some delay. Let D 2 f0; 1; 2; ::g denote the delays in detecting that misreports
have occurred. Let hi;t 1 2 Hi;t 1 stand for the history of payo¤s of bank
i up to period t   1 where Hi;t 1 represents the set of all possible histories.
14For our purposes, it is enough to assume that the banks beliefs about misreporting is
correlated with the actual decisions. However, our strong assumption simplies the analysis.
Without it, we would need to specify a mechanism through which banks (stochastically) notice
that misreporting has occurred.
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Thus, hi;t 1 = (i;1; i;2; ::i;t 1). Strategy for bank i in the repeated game is
a sequence of maps from possible histories to actions: si;t : Hi;t 1 ! ftr;mg
for t = 0; 1; 2; :::1. For convenience, we denote by Htri;t 1 the set of truthful
histories, representing histories that no misreport has occurred reveal that up
to period t  1.
E¢ cient punishment is only possible if the misreporting bank can be iden-
tied. An ine¢ cient way of sanction is when a bank that notices that misre-
porting has occured, starts misreporting as well. Despite the lack of e¢ cient
punishment, truthful reporting is achievable, even though it is not a unique
equilibrium.
Proposition 2 In the innitely repeated setup and decentralized case, the game
has multiple Nash equilibria under some conditions.
Proof. In general, in repeated games a large number of equilibria may be con-
structed. We construct just two (one leading to truthful reporting, the other
to general misreporting) to show that truthful reporting is not uniquely imple-
mentable.
On the one hand, the strategy prole of misreporting in each period upon
observing any history constitutes a Nash equilibrium, since there is no protable
unilateral deviation. Given that all other banks misreport, the best response is
to misreport as well. Hence, (si;t = m)i2N in any period is a Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, the grim trigger strategy prole may induce truthful
reporting by each bank in each period. Consider the grim trigger strategy
of reporting truthfully in the rst period, continuing to do so until the rst
misreporting is detected, after which misreporting ensues forever. If D = 0,
then misreporting is detected immediately, but by allowing for D > 0, we take
into account that misreporting can go on for a while. Bank i starts reporting
truthfully, but when a misreport is noticed through the payo¤, then bank i
starts misreporting as well. Formally,
si;t =

tr if hi;t D 2 Htri;t D
m otherwise.
and assume hi;0 2 Htri;0. Note that we take into account the delay in hi;t D 2
Htri;t D. This grim trigger strategy may conduce to cooperation if deviation does
not pay o¤. Suppose that up to period  no misreporting has occurred, but at
this stage a magnitude-1 shock hits bank i and the bank decides to misreport.
Then bank i has a gain of earning tb instead of 
t
b   tcc through periods
t = f ; :: +Dg, but this gain is followed by an innite stream of zero payo¤s,
since no bank reports truthfully thereafter. Thus, the discounted value of payo¤s
resulting from the deviation is
+DX
t=
ttb. Alternatively, by reporting truthfully
(and provided that all other banks do so in the future), bank i would enjoy the
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expected payo¤ given by (5). Therefore, if
+DX
t=
ttb 
1X
t=
t

tb   E(pi;t)ctc

; (6)
then no bank has an incentive to deviate from truthful reporting. Straight-
forward algebra yields that the previous condition is equivalent to
1  b
1  c
<
D+1
pc
+D+1b
c
(7)
Thus, the grim trigger strategy leads to truthful reporting by each bank in
each period.
While the previous condition (7) seems complicated, suppose for simplicity
that  = 0; D = 0 and b = c = . That is, the bank that misreports starts
to do so at t = 0 and misreporting is noticed through payo¤s immediately.
Moreover, the benets and costs of truthful reporting lose value with time at
the same rate.15 In this case, the condition boils down to
c  
p
;
where p = E(pi;t). This simple condition indicates that when the cost of
truthful reporting is low enough compared to the ratio of the discounting terms
and the probability of big losses, then strategies like the grim trigger may sustain
the good equilibrium of truthful reporting. Thus, compared to the one-shot case
repeated interaction helps, since truthful reporting becomes a possible outcome,
but not the unique one. The result also shows that cooperation is possible
due to the potential loss of future benets which can be seen as an implicit
punishment for misreporting. This reasoning suggests that truthful reporting
can be achieved if punishment is made in a more e¢ cient way. Punishment
cannot be e¢ cient if misreporting is noticed or detected with a long delay. In
condition (7), as D becomes large (D !1), the inequality cannot hold.
The result also explains that a data consortium may work properly even in
the absence of well-dened sanctions if member banks follow strict reporting
norms as symbolized by the grim trigger strategy.16 In fact, the lack of pub-
lished evidence about banksmisreporting their operational risk events suggests
that these data consortia contain good quality data, although publicly available
membership documents only require that banks do their best when reporting
without specifying sanctions if misreporting is detected. For instance, the par-
ticipation agreement of the data consortium GOLD (UK) puts "Participants
15Note that if b < c, then the benets gained from consortium data decrease more quickly
than the costs, and if a bank misreports, then it maximizes the potential gains by doing so
at t = 0. The same holds for b = c, since due to time discounting, the biggest gains of
misreporting accrue for low values of t. Hence, misreporting at t = 0 can be easily rationalized.
16There are studies (both theoretical and experimental) showing why agents may be averse
to break norms. See, for instance, López-Pérez (2008).
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... commit to provide loss event data to the best of their institutional ability",
but does not hold out the prospect of any punishment for banks that do not do
so.17 According to the previous result, if banks adhere to the norm of truthful
reporting, then it becomes the unique outcome. Proposition 2, however, also
suggests that if there is no chance to detect misreports (D ! 1), then there
may be equilibria leading to the breakdown of the data consortium.
4.2 Supervisor
In the last subsection we argued that if banks follow high-standard reporting
norms, then this internal driving force is enough to make data consortia work
appropriately. However, if such norms are not part of banksbehavior due to
whatever reason (e.g. fear of losing condentiality, general low level of trust in a
country, generalized opportunistic behavior, etc.), then we cannot expect data
consortia to function properly in a decentralized way, and an external device
may be needed to enforce truthful reporting. We assume in this subsection that
banks do not use grim trigger strategies. They do not punish by misreporting
themselves.
In this section, we introduce a supervisor that has a double role: i) to validate
the reported data with some probability and ii) to impose a punishment upon
detecting that a bank misreports. Let q 2 [0; 1] be the probability with which the
supervisor examines a given bank in any period. Hence, the expected number
of periods until being checked is 1q .
When hit by a magnitude-1 shock and given that the other banks report
truthfully, in period  a bank that misreports obtains a payo¤ b instead of
b   c c. Since truthfulness is not observable, a bank can go on misreporting
until it is detected. A bank misreports only when hit by a large shock, and
possibly the supervisor examines it when su¤ering a small shock. Therefore,
in expected terms a bank that misreports when being hit by a large shock is
detected after 1qp periods. The present value of the expected total payo¤ of
misreporting (and supposing that all other banks report truthfully) evaluated
at period  is
E(M) =
+ 1qpX
t=
tb
t =
1  (b)
1
qp
1  b
: (8)
Note that the above expected total payo¤ is the maximum gain from mis-
reporting since it supposes that no other bank misreports. We consider two
possible punishments: a non-monetary one and a monetary lump-sum ne.
The rst consists of exclusion from the data consortium for a given number
of periods (z) and it can be seen as a stigma. Other banks will not be willing
to cooperate with the excluded bank in the case of other data exchange initia-
tives or other type of banking interactions.18 Unfortunately, data consortia do
17The participation agreement is available on the Internet at
www.bba.org.uk/content/1/c4/65/05/GOLD_Brochure.pdf).
18This punishment is a kind of temporary ostracism. Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989)
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not disclose their full policy on operations, so we cannot give well-documented
examples of exclusions. However, there is anecdotal evidence that in the case
of detection of misreporting (or lack of reporting) the membership of the insti-
tution might be suspended, and the suspension might be canceled if there is a
backward looking upload of past data. We note also that alternative sanctions
based on exclusion are also possible. A stricter form of punishment would be if
the bank that is excluded from the consortium would never receive the data for
the periods of exclusion.
The second punishment implies monetary ne imposed on the misreporting
bank. We are not aware of monetary punishment in data consortia, but given
that monetary sanctions are a very common form in other areas, we thought it
worthwhile to consider this alternative as well.
4.2.1 Non-monetary punishment
If a bank is found to have misreported, then it is excluded from the consortium
for z periods. After the exclusion, the bank is readmitted and benets from
using the external data. Hence, the exclusion entails payo¤s of zero during z
periods, so the discounted total payo¤ during the punishment is Pnm = 0:
Using the previous expected discounted payo¤s, we obtain the following
result:
Proposition 3 If
c <
(1  c)
h

1
qp (b   z+1)
i
p(1  b)(1  
1
qp+z+1)
(9)
holds, then each bank reports truthfully in each period.
Proof. A bank reports truthfully in the current period if and only if
E(M) + 
1
qpPnm + (
1
qp+z+1)E(T ) < E(T ): (10)
The expression compares the expected discounted payo¤s of misreporting
and truthful reporting. The left-hand side has the expected discounted payo¤s
of misreporting that consist of the expected discounted payo¤ of misreporting
during 1qp periods, followed by the discounted (zero) payo¤ of z periods of exclu-
sion and after 1pq + z periods the expected discounted payo¤s of being member
of the data consortium again. On the right-hand side, the expected discounted
payo¤of a truthfully reporting bank is presented. Straightforward algebra yields
that (10) is equivalent to (9).
The proposition says that if the cost of reporting truthfully is low enough
given the parameters of the economic environment, then no bank will nd it
protable to misreport. Consider the cost that equalizes both sides of (9). We
call it the threshold cost since it makes a bank indi¤erent between being truthful
show theoretically how ostracizing noncooperators maintains cooperation. This nding is
corroborated by experiments as well (see, for example, Cinyabuguma et al. (2005)).
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or untruthful. An increase in this threshold cost can be interpreted as a gain the
bank derives from a well-functioning consortium, since the threshold cost tells
how large the cost (relative to the benets) should be to eliminate the benets
from reporting truthfully.
The discount factor (), the depreciation factors of benets and costs (b and
c) and the expected value of the probability of large shocks (p) are exogenous
to the data consortium. The discount and the depreciation factors may depend
on country- and bank-specic conditions. For instance, in countries with a sta-
ble banking system, we expect  to be higher than in countries with a volatile
banking environment. In the same vein, older and well-established banks may
exhibit a higher discount factor. The other two factors on the right-hand side
of condition (9), that is, the probability of examination (q) and the length of
exclusion (z), are choice variables of the data consortium. Partial derivatives
indicate that the right-hand side of condition (9) increases both in the proba-
bility of examination (q) and in the length of exclusion (z). This points to the
possibility of lowering the probability of examination to levels that do not deter
banks from participating in the data consortium, while augmenting the length
of exclusion to high levels, so that banks never nd it optimal to misreport.
Unfortunately, q and z cannot be chosen arbitrarily if condition (9) is to be
satised. Moreover, for some parameter values condition (9) cannot be met at
all, as shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If truthful reporting is to be uniquely implemented, the proba-
bility of examination cannot be kept arbitrarily low. There may be a range of
costs (c 2

(1 c)b
1
p
p(1 b) ; 1

) for which banks may nd it optimal to misreport.
Proof. Let G(q; z) =
(1 c)


1
qp (b z+1)

p(1 b)((1 
1
qp
+z+1
))
. G(q; z) is a continuous function.
Since limq!0G = 0, for any given cost and length of exclusion there is a 0 < q^,
such that for q < q^ the relation G(q; z) < c holds. Therefore, if the probability of
examination is arbitrarily reduced, condition (9) is violated. As a consequence,
truthful reporting cannot be uniquely achieved, proving the rst part of the
proposition. As regards the second part, even if banks are examined in each
period (q = 1) and the highest (that is, innite) punishment is imposed on
misreporting banks (z ! 1), for very high costs condition (9) cannot be met.
This is the case because limq!1;z!1G =
(1 c)b
1
p
p(1 b) that may be less than 1:
For instance, if c = b, then the limit equals
b
1
p
p , which for high values of p
is less than 1:
The above result implies that data consortia may perform better in envi-
ronments where i) the discount factor () is higher; ii) the depreciation factor
of benets (b) is higher; and iii) the depreciation factor of costs (c) is lower,
since in these cases, ceteris paribus, the range of costs for which banks may nd
it optimal to misreport diminishes, that is, truthful reporting is more likely to
obtain.
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The previous result also suggests that applying even the harshest sanctions
(in the form of everlasting exclusion) alone is not enough to deter banks from
misreporting in some environments. Note that our variable q can be interpreted
as the e¤ort that the consortium puts into controling quality, for instance, by
checking data carefully or cross-checking losses with other databases. Proposi-
tion 4 highlights the importance of these activities as well. While in the above
result we showed that the probability of examination (q) and the length of exclu-
sion (z) cannot be chosen separately and arbitrarily so that truthful reporting
is achieved, the next corollary establishes a condition regarding the joint choice
of these variables that guarantees truthful reporting.
Corollary 1 If q and z are chosen so that
1  ( 1
1  b
  pc
1  c
)(1  b) < (11)
< 
1
qp (
1
qp
b   z+1(
1
1  b
  pc
1  c
)(1  b))
holds, then each bank reports truthfully in each period.
Proof. Consider condition (10) that implies truthful reporting. Note that
b; c; ; p; c are given by the environment, while q and z are the choice variables
of the data consortium. By rearranging the condition to have all elements
containing q or z on one side, we obtain condition (11).
This corollary determines a condition that the joint choice of the probability
of examination (q) and the length of exclusion (z) should fulll so that banks
report truthfully. Overall, the message of this section is that though the existing
data consortia seem to work properly, it is not evident that this should be the
case for future data consortia. The careful mix of checking the data quality and
the appropriate sanctions when reporting problems emerge may ensure that the
data consortium works as desired.
A numerical example We consider a numerical example to see whether the
previous result restricts considerably the possibilities that all banks reporting
truthfully in each period be the unique equilibrium. We x the discount factor,
the depreciation factors of costs and benets and the probability of large shocks
( = 0:9; b = c = 1; p = 0:1) and calculate the threshold cost as q and z
vary. The probability of examinations goes from 0 to 1, while the length of
exclusion ranges from 0 to 100. Figure 1 reveals that regarding the probability
of examination the biggest changes in the threshold cost (and, consequently,
in gains from being a member of a data consortium) accrue for relatively low
values, since the slope is the highest in that region. An interpretation is that to
foster the proper performance of a data consortium, the important thing is to
give the impression that misreporting banks can be detected. It is not necessary
that each bank be audited frequently; q can be kept low so that anonymity is
not overly compromised. Banks should perceive that there is some positive (but
17
not necessarily high) probability of being detected if they misreport. The case
of DIPO as described in the Introduction can be considered an example.
0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 25 100
0,0
0,3
0,5
0,8
1,0
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
Th
re
sh
ol
d 
co
st
q
z
Figure 1: Threshold cost as z and q vary ( = 0:9; p = 0; 1)
If we analyze jointly the increase in the length of exclusion and the prob-
ability of examination, then Figure 1 suggests that already for relatively low
values of q a su¢ ciently long exclusion drives up considerably the threshold
cost. Hence, if the data consortium is designed in a way that reects these fea-
tures, then it can be expected to work properly. However, it is worth mentioning
that exclusion might cause additional problems on representativeness and may
disturb time series analysis possibilities. Actually, we do not take exclusion lit-
erally, but as a proxy for stigma. A bank that misreports loses trustworthiness
and other banks will not be willing to cooperate with it in any area. Hence,
exclusion can be thought of as discipline imposed by the member banks.
4.2.2 Monetary punishment
If the supervisor catches a bank misreporting, it imposes a monetary ne of Pm.
In the next period, the misreporting bank can participate in the data consortium
as before. The next result shows that setting an appropriate monetary ne
prevents misreporting.
Proposition 5 If  
1
qp
b
1 b +
(1 
1
qp
+1
)pc

1
qp (1 c)
< Pm, then no bank nds it optimal to
misreport in any period.
Proof. A bank reports truthfully in the current period if and only if
E(M)   1qpPm + ( 1qp+1)E(T ) < E(T ): (12)
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On the left-hand side we present the discounted payo¤s of misreporting:
E(M) represents the expected discounted total payo¤ of misreporting, Pm
stands for the monetary ne that a misreporting bank is expected to face af-
ter 1qp periods and after the ne the bank enjoys again the benets (E(T )) of
belonging to a well-functioning data consortium. The right-hand side shows
the discounted payo¤ of all banks reporting truthfully. Straightforward algebra
yields the condition in the proposition.
The proposition tells that if member banks are willing to impose a su¢ ciently
high ne on misreporting banks, then no bank misreports. To the best of our
knowledge, data consortia do not impose monetary sanctions; compliance to
truthful reporting is rather induced by non-monetary incentives. It may be due
to the nature of data consortia, which is based on mutual sharing of reliable
data. Participants may believe that monetary punishment would hamper the
cooperation. If the sanction is seen as the price a bank pays for not reporting in
accordance with the required standards, then monetary punishment may prove
counterproductive, because an extrinsic price motivation crowds out the intrinsic
motivation of cooperation.19 However, in our setup the monetary punishment
is set in a way that it is never used. It serves just as a deterrent, so in principal
it should not a¤ect cooperation negatively. In countries where non-monetary
incentives do not work properly due to lack of trust or other reasons, applying
nes may yield the desired deterrent e¤ect.
5 Conclusion
In operational risk management, the increasing importance of external data
coming from data consortia calls for studying the workings of these data-sharing
arrangements. While most of the existing data consortia work adequately, we
highlight the consequences of possible improper reporting that may be due to
unjustied fear of condentiality loss, mistrust and other reasons. Although
empirical evidence on this issue is scarce, it seems important to study these
problems, as more data consortia are desired and planned to be set up in coun-
tries where misreporting may become a concern.
Our model tries to capture these features: banks do not want to disclose
operational losses, but would like to know the true operational losses of other
banks to avoid them. We show that if misreports cannot be detected, then
misreporting is the dominant strategy in a one-shot game and is a possible out-
come in an innitely repeated game. We also claim that strict reporting norms
may lead to truthful reporting. In the absence of norms, we study the e¤ect
of an external device that we call supervisor. Uniqueness can be implemented
if a supervisor has the right to check the validity of reported data. Even if
anonymity is practically maintained (the probability of examination converging
to zero), su¢ ciently severe monetary punishment induces banks to report truth-
fully. Non-monetary punishment in the form of temporary exclusion from the
19For this sort of arguments, see, for instance, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) or Bénabou
and Tirole (2003).
19
data consortium may achieve the same result under some conditions, although
for some parameter values truthful reporting is not the unique possible outcome.
Nonetheless, a numerical example suggests that even for small probabilities of
examination that possibly do not deter banks from entering a data consortium,
a su¢ ciently long exclusion enhances the benets of data consortia, making
them a successful data-sharing arrangement.
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